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This paper -a product of the Agricultural Policies Division, Agriculture and Rural Development Department -is part of an cftort to investigate rural credit markets, f.arm investmecnt, and agricultural productivity in C'hinia. That research is part of a larger effort in PRE to deternine how financial intermediation affects economic activities. Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818 li Street NW, Washington DC 20433. Please contact Cicely Spooner, room N8-039, extension 3(064 (35 pages).
After 20 years oi colleclivization, China's tion with issues of farm size and consolidation agricultural sector was reformned in the last are unwarranted. The production gains from decade. Individual fami/household units reconsolidation would be limited and the costs placed collective production. Households were substantial. given individual leases on forner commune land first for 3-5 years, but now for 15 years, and Where farms are tiny, farm size is a problem even longer for tree crops.
--but coercing consolidation or recollectivization would be harmful. It would be preferable to Household data on1 four areas in China in introduce institutional mechanisms and proce-1987-88 revealed pattems of spending on1 dures to facilitate market-induced land transacproductive assets, durable consumer goods, and tions. More mobility of labor would also help. housing.
Concems about the inadequacy of investUsing a model of household production and ment finance for agricultural households are not investment decisions, Feder, Lau, Lin, and Luo yet justified in areas where the supply of such analyzed data on several factors that had been production inputs as fertilizer is unsatisfactory. thoughit to inhibit investment in farm capital and But once the input supply system improves, encourage residential or other nonfarm investlimited credit will become a constraint -and ments: the typically small size of farms together the rural credit system, which is geared to rural with increasing retunis !o scale in production; industry and commerce, will have to be inadequate credit; and farmers' perceptions of reoriented. insecurity because of possible policy shifts during the life of their leases on state-owned land Radical revision of the land tenure system is or the likelihood of being assigned other lands not called for as the land Ieasing system seems when the contract matures.
not to be hampering investment. But likely crosion of investment incentives will be averted What were the policy implications of the if leases are extended before they mature, study results? reassuring farmers about the government's longterm commitment to the present system. If the four study sites reflect the situation elsewhere in China, policymakers' preoccupa- After twenty years of collectivized agriculture, China's agricultural sector underwent a major reform during the last decade. A key element of the reform was the introduction of the "household responsibility system", which replaced the collective production mode by Individual farm household units. Households were given control over former commune land through Individual contracts (Initially for 3-5 years, but presently for 15 years with even longer periods for tree crops).
Asido from a commitment to provide certain prespecifled grain quotas at government-set prices, and the obligation to pay taxes, farmers now have the freedom to make cropping and Input decislons, and are allowed to retain any profits which they earn.
The Improved Incentives brought about by the Institutional reform, combined with higher prices for key agricultural products, Induced an unprecedented acceleration of agricultural growth In China. Between 1979 and 1984 the value of agricultural output (In constant prices) grew at an average of 7.5 percent per year, mostly due to Improved incentives (Lin, 1988; McMIllan et al., 1989 Insights regarding farmers' tenure security perceptions can be derived from responses to specific questions pertalning to the po3sibillty of land reallocatlon.
These questions were Included In the f,lrvey underlying the present study. As Indicated In Table 2 , In three of the counties studled, only a minority of the farmers perceive a hlgh likelihood of lanJ reallocation before the current contract expires. In contrast, in Xlajlang county three-quarters of the farmers expect land reallocation before the contract expires, I.e., a majority of the farmers In the courty do not have much faith In authorities' commitment to the present allocation.
This result Is compatible with the fact that the survey In Xlajlang county took 258). In the areas covered by the present study, the share of short term loans out of all Institutlonal loans varles between 90 percent and 100 percent in the four counties (Feder et al., 1989) . It Is possible, of course, to finance investment by repeatedly rolling over short-term loans. In fact, the structure of Interest rates In China provided Incentives for such a rollover, as Interest rates on short-term production loans were lower than Interest rates on medium-term loans throughout the period under study (World Bank, 1988b , paper 7, annex 1, Institutional credit, which Is by-and-large short-term, Informal credit In the study areas Is mostly medium and long term, or has no definite maturity date (Feder et al., 1989) . It Is likely that relatives and friends are more Inclined to lend money for purposes of house construction and special social events (e.g. weddings) which are perceived as a basic need deserving assistance. They are less likely to provide Interest-free loans for agricultural Investment which Is undertaken for the purpose of Increasing the borrower's Income. Table 3 Indlcates that a higher share of non-institutional credit Is devoted to purposes not related to production, and a significant proportion of It Is used to finance constructlon rather than productive Investment. Because of their ability to monitor borrowers activitles, loans acquired from relatives and friends are typically used for the specific purposes for which they were granted, and thus do not add to overall liquidity. It Is therefore expected that Informal credit Is not available as a significant source of funding for farm Investment In the study areas. 1983, which In the study areas was a year when the new production mode was at
Initial stages of Implementation, and 1988 (or 1987 In the case of Gongzhullng)
when the reform was well In place, and farmers had already benefitted from several 2 The survey covered several types of land improvements, such as clearlng of stumps and constructing bunds, but there was llttle variatlon In the data as most of these Improvements were already undertaken before the reforms. Other types of improvements were difficult to quantify. Investment In house construction or housing Improvement Is a major form of asset accumulation for farmers In China (Tam, 1988) . Table 7 Improvement Is substantial. On average, the outlay on house Improvements for households undertaking such Improvements was more than thelr average annual Income, exceeding productive Investment by a wide margin (last llne In Table 7 ).
The share of housing Investment In the total outlay on productive Investment and But It Is also possible that some of the factors hampering Incentives for productive Investment Induce an asset composition more heavily dominated by residential capital (e.g., limited tenure security, segmented credit markets, and small farm size). These Issues need to be Investigated empirically, but prior to the econometric analysis a formal model needs to be presented to underly the empirical work. 
V. A Model of Houseiold Consumption and investment
Consider a household maxlmizing its utility over a two-period planning horizon. Utility Is defined over a composite consumption good (C) and over housing services (H). For simplicity, we assume separability of utillty.
T -UO(CO) + Vo(Ho) + U 1 (Cj) + V 1 (Hj)
where T Is total utility. U and V are respectively the utilitles from composito consumption and housing services, and the numerical subscripts denote tine perlods. The time discount factor Is omitted for simplicity, as It can be embodied
In the definitlon of U, and V 1 .
The household has an Initial endowment of financlal resources Wo, which Is augmented with borrowed funds L. These resources can be used In the first period for consumption (Co), Investment in productive assets (I) and Investment
In housing (h). Other Initlal endowments are capital (K 0 ), land (Ao) and housing (Ho). These are assumed liliquld and cannot therefore be used for financing consumption or Investment. The budget constraint Is given by
In the second pe.-od, If no change In the land endowment occurs, the augmented capital stock (that Is, Initial capltal plus first period Investment) Is combined wlth the initlal land endowment to produce output via a neoclassical production function. Consumption In the second period Is then the value of output minus the debt repayment. However, If agriculture Is recollectivized or the land Is taken away (an event with probability P), then the farmer receives only some fixed future Income Y, all debt Is cancelled, and production capital Is taken over by the state. 3 Second period consumption Is therefore C 1 -F(Ko + l, Ao) -(1+r)*L with probability 1-P
C 1 ' Y with probability P (4) where F Is the production function and r Is the Interest rate.
Maxuization of the expected value of utility subject to equations (2), (3),
First order conditions for optimum require -U + (1-P) * U; * Fk ' ° (6) 0 -UO + V; -O (7) where Fk Is the marginal productivity of capital.
3 The model could be formuWated with a less extreme scenario wnereby there Is a probability of losing only a portion of the land and a portion of capital. While the mathematics would be more tedious, the results wouWd be skiilar.
Comparative statie results generated by the model are summerized In Table 8 .
Proofs can be provided by the authors to Interested readers. 
VL Econometric Results
The fIrst empirical Issue which needs to be clarified relates to returns to scale. Proponents of consolidation and recollectivization assume that there are Increasing returns to scale In Chinese agriculture. Investment and productivity would thus be enhanced If typical farm sizes were larger. In order to estimate the returns to scale In agricultural production within our study areas, conventional
Cobb-Douglas production functions were estimated ( Table 9 ). The output In these functions relates to crops but excludes livestock products, as livestock activities (poultry and plgs) are not directly related to farm size. Corresponding to this notion of output, the measure of capital utilized includes the value of equipment, machinery and draft animals, but excludes the value of other livestock.
The estimates indlcate that In the two counties with larger farm holdings (Gongzhuling and Xlajlang), productlon can be characterized by constant returns to scale, as the sum of productin elasticities does not differ slgnificantly from t (line (g). In the two counties with small farm sizes (Tal and Jurong) returns to scale are statistically significantly larger than 1. Tal county, with the smallest We proceed next to analyze the determinants of Investment in productive assets. In order to allow for a better correspondence between the tenure security variables and the type of Investment considered, only Investment In cropping-related capital Is con3idered (e.g., livestock Is excluded). The estknated model corresPonds to the reduced form of the system of first-order conditions (6) -(7) as swumarized in Table 8 Note: The numbers show the percentages of respondents who stated tsat they were not able to obtaln the desired quantities of Inputs even though they were willing to pay higher than market prices.
Source : Feder et al., 1990. where Input supply problems are negligible and farm sizes are larger. In the other three counties formal credit does not significantly affect Investment, and It would thus seem that generally credit was not a binding constralnt on crop-related Investment In these counties. In Tal and Jurong counties, demand for Investment has likely been low due to the low marginal productivity of capital and small farm sizes. In Xlajlang county farm sizes are larger, but Inadequate Input supplies are a serous problem, apparently diminishing the profitability of, and hence the demand for, farm capital.
Concerns regarding land reallocation did not hinder productive Investment signlficantly (none of the coefficients are statistically significant). This Is, apparently because farmers expected (at least at the time of the survey) that the general household responsibillty productlon mode will prevail, and may have perceived the transaction costs of capital stock adjustment which will be Incurred upon reallocatlon to be minor. Insecurity of land tenure, stemming from the absence of private ownership and apprehension regarding disruption of the existing land allocation, does not appear to have been a significant factor affecting Investments before 1989.
However, as current land contracts were awarded for 15 years, Investments In the years past the mid-point of contract maturity (I.e., towards the mid 90's) may be more sensitive to perceptions regarding land reallocatlon. Since the data show that the majority of farmers think It Is likely that they will not be allocated the same parcels of land upon contract maturity, this Issue Is potentially significant and requires remedial policy (e.g., by extending current contract maturities several years before they expiro). have not been Implemented, and apprehension regarding land contract cancellation upon renting-out may still be a factor.
